The Ninth Circuit also reversed the issue of attorney eligibility in Weissburg v. Lancaster School District, supra.
Contractual Authorization
Review of the district court's finding of statutory or contractual authorization can also lead to de novo opinions and reversals. In Hyde v. Midland Credit Management, a debtor brought an action against a debt collector for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. After a bench trial, the district court returned a verdict in favor of the collector. The collector moved for attorney fees. (Ibid.) The district court granted the motion and found the debtor and his attorneys were jointly and severally liable for the award. The Ninth Circuit reversed as to the attorneys. The court noted that it reviews "de novo the legal question of whether attorney's fees and costs may be awarded" under a statute. It held, on a matter of first impression, that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not authorize a district court to order that an attorney (as opposed to a party) pay an attorney fee award.
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the issue of statutory or contractual authorization in Oregon Natural Desert Association.
Statutory Requirements -
The Ninth Circuit has also applied a de novo standard of review, and reversed and vacated attorney fee awards because it disagreed with the district court's interpretation of statutory requirements. Most recently, in Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir sued an individual for failure to sufficiently collateralize a municipal loan. The city voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit, and the individual filed a defamation claim and a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the city. The city moved to strike the defamation claim under California's anti-SLAPP statute and to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. The district court granted the motion to strike, but denied the motion to dismiss.
The court awarded Unruh act attorney fees to the city on the basis of the successful anti SLAPP motion and later granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the malicious prosecution claim. The attorney fee award included fees not only for the successful anti-SLAPP motion, but also the unsuccessful motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim "to the extent that any of those hours were 'inextricably intertwined' with the anti-SLAPP motion."
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the order as to the fees for the malicious prosecution claim. It stated "any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation which figure in the district court's decision are reviewable de novo." (Ibid.) The Ninth Circuit held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act requires that a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim be found "unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious" in order for a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees. (Ibid.) The court noted that the district court had failed to make the requisite finding. (Ibid.)
The Ninth Circuit also reversed or vacated on the issue of statutory requirements.
Method of Amount Determination
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has applied a de novo standard of review and vacated fee awards because it disagreed with the district court's method of determining the amount of the award. In Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court, supra, a former Arizona court employee sued her former employer, the state court, for violations of, among other things, Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the employer's motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, and awarded the employer attorney fees.
The majority of the employer's request for attorney fees was not allocated to a specific claim in the case, but instead was designated "general fees." To determine the amount of the attorney fee award, the district court divided the general fees equally across the 10 claims in the em ployee's complaint; then for each claim for which an award was appropriate, it added one-tenth of the general fees to the total. (Ibid.)
